Protagoras: Difference between revisions
ἔνδον γὰρ ἁνὴρ ἄρτι τυγχάνει, κάρα στάζων ἱδρῶτι καὶ χέρας ξιφοκτόνους → yes, the man is now inside, his face and hands that have slaughtered with the sword dripping with sweat
(Woodhouse 5) |
mNo edit summary |
||
| (12 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{ | {{WoodhouseENELnames | ||
| | |Text=[[Πρωταγόρας]], -ου, ὁ. | ||
[[Protagoran]], [[of Protagoras]], adj.: [[Πρωταγόρειος]]. | |||
}} | |||
{{Lewis | |||
|lshtext=<b>Prōtăgŏras</b>: ae, m., = [[Πρωταγόρας]],<br /><b>I</b> a [[celebrated]] [[sophist]] of [[Abdera]], a [[disciple]] of [[Democritus]], and an [[older]] [[contemporary]] of [[Socrates]]; he [[was]] [[banished]] from [[Athens]] on a [[suspicion]] of atheism, Cic. N. D. 1, 1, 2; 1, 23, 63; id. Ac. 2, 46, 142; id. Brut. 8, 30; 12, 46; Gell. 5, 3, 1 sqq.—Hence, Prōtăgŏrīon, ĭi, n., = [[Πρωταγόρειον]], a [[dictum]] or [[maxim]] of [[Protagoras]], Gell. 5, 11, 1. | |||
}} | |||
{{Gaffiot | |||
|gf=<b>Prōtăgŏrās</b>,¹⁵ æ, m. ([[Πρωταγόρας]]), sophiste d’Abdère, chassé par les Athéniens pour son impiété : Cic. Nat. 1, 2 ; Br. 30 || <b>-rīŏn</b>, ĭī, n., une [[maxime]] de [[Protagoras]] : Gell. 5, 11, 1.||<b>-rīŏn</b>, ĭī, n., une [[maxime]] de [[Protagoras]] : Gell. 5, 11, 1. | |||
}} | |||
{{Georges | |||
|georg=Prōtagorās, ae, Akk. am u. ān, Vok. ā, m. ([[Πρωταγόρας]]), [[ein]] griech. [[Philosoph]] aus [[Abdera]], [[Zeitgenosse]] [[des]] Sokrates, aus Attika verbannt, [[weil]] er in den [[Verdacht]] [[des]] [[Atheismus]] kam, Gell. 5, 3, 1 sqq. Cic. de nat. deor. 1, 2. Quint. 3, 1, 10 u. 12; 3, 4, 10: Pr. [[Abderites]], Min. Fel. 8, 3: Pr. sophista, Apul. flor. 18. p. 29, 23 u. 30, 1 Kr. – Dav. Prōtagorīon, īī, n. ([[Πρωταγόρειον]]), [[ein]] [[Ausspruch]] [[des]] [[Protagoras]], Gell. 5, 11 in. | |||
}} | |||
{{wkpen | |||
|wketx=[[Protagoras]] (/prəʊˈtæɡəˌræs/; Greek: [[Πρωταγόρας]]; c. 490 BC – c. 420 BC) was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher and rhetorical theorist. He is numbered as one of the sophists by Plato. In his dialogue Protagoras, Plato credits him with inventing the role of the professional sophist. | |||
Protagoras also is believed to have created a major controversy during ancient times through his statement that, "Man is the measure of all things," interpreted (possibly wrongly, since he disagreed) by Plato to mean that there is no objective truth; Protagoras seems to have meant that each person's own personal history, experiences and expectations, developed over their lifetime, determine their judgments, opinions, and statements regarding "truth" (which is the title of the book in which Protagoras made this statement). When a person makes a judgment about a certain thing—good or bad or beautiful or unjust—that person will differ from other people's judgments because their experience has been different. | |||
This concept of individual relativity was intended to be provocative; naturally, it drew fire from Plato and other philosophers, contrasting with both popular opinion and other philosophical doctrine that reality and its truth must have an objective grounding. But it was part of Protagoras' point that the statement is somewhat counterintuitive. He argued that believing that others' opinions about the world are valid and must be respected, even if our own experience of truth is different, is necessary for a community to base itself and its decisions on open, democratic debate. | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 13:54, 4 November 2022
English > Greek (Woodhouse)
Πρωταγόρας, -ου, ὁ.
Protagoran, of Protagoras, adj.: Πρωταγόρειος.
Latin > English (Lewis & Short)
Prōtăgŏras: ae, m., = Πρωταγόρας,
I a celebrated sophist of Abdera, a disciple of Democritus, and an older contemporary of Socrates; he was banished from Athens on a suspicion of atheism, Cic. N. D. 1, 1, 2; 1, 23, 63; id. Ac. 2, 46, 142; id. Brut. 8, 30; 12, 46; Gell. 5, 3, 1 sqq.—Hence, Prōtăgŏrīon, ĭi, n., = Πρωταγόρειον, a dictum or maxim of Protagoras, Gell. 5, 11, 1.
Latin > French (Gaffiot 2016)
Prōtăgŏrās,¹⁵ æ, m. (Πρωταγόρας), sophiste d’Abdère, chassé par les Athéniens pour son impiété : Cic. Nat. 1, 2 ; Br. 30 || -rīŏn, ĭī, n., une maxime de Protagoras : Gell. 5, 11, 1.
Latin > German (Georges)
Prōtagorās, ae, Akk. am u. ān, Vok. ā, m. (Πρωταγόρας), ein griech. Philosoph aus Abdera, Zeitgenosse des Sokrates, aus Attika verbannt, weil er in den Verdacht des Atheismus kam, Gell. 5, 3, 1 sqq. Cic. de nat. deor. 1, 2. Quint. 3, 1, 10 u. 12; 3, 4, 10: Pr. Abderites, Min. Fel. 8, 3: Pr. sophista, Apul. flor. 18. p. 29, 23 u. 30, 1 Kr. – Dav. Prōtagorīon, īī, n. (Πρωταγόρειον), ein Ausspruch des Protagoras, Gell. 5, 11 in.
Wikipedia EN
Protagoras (/prəʊˈtæɡəˌræs/; Greek: Πρωταγόρας; c. 490 BC – c. 420 BC) was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher and rhetorical theorist. He is numbered as one of the sophists by Plato. In his dialogue Protagoras, Plato credits him with inventing the role of the professional sophist.
Protagoras also is believed to have created a major controversy during ancient times through his statement that, "Man is the measure of all things," interpreted (possibly wrongly, since he disagreed) by Plato to mean that there is no objective truth; Protagoras seems to have meant that each person's own personal history, experiences and expectations, developed over their lifetime, determine their judgments, opinions, and statements regarding "truth" (which is the title of the book in which Protagoras made this statement). When a person makes a judgment about a certain thing—good or bad or beautiful or unjust—that person will differ from other people's judgments because their experience has been different.
This concept of individual relativity was intended to be provocative; naturally, it drew fire from Plato and other philosophers, contrasting with both popular opinion and other philosophical doctrine that reality and its truth must have an objective grounding. But it was part of Protagoras' point that the statement is somewhat counterintuitive. He argued that believing that others' opinions about the world are valid and must be respected, even if our own experience of truth is different, is necessary for a community to base itself and its decisions on open, democratic debate.
